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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
INGA-LILL ELTON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT

BOARD, an agency of the
State of Utah,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
12809

Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for benefits under the Judicial Retirement Act.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court awarded the Respondent, Mrs. Elton,
the benefits provided by the Judicial Retirement Act.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mrs. Elton seeks affirmance of the decision of the
lower court.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mrs. Elton does not accept the statement of facts pro.
posed by the Appellant.
The Appellant has artfully singled out those facts
which it believes support its position and has studiously
avoided those facts which support the decision of the
lower court.
It should not at this time require citation of authority for the proposition that on appeal the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the decision of the
lower court, but if it does, see Hardy v. Henricksen, No.
12354, Supreme Court of the State of Utah, filed March
16, 1972.
As her Statement of Facts, Mrs. Elton submits the
following:
Judge Leonard Elton was appointed to the bench of
the Third Judicial District in 1966 after a distinguished
career as a trial lawyer (R. 64). At that time he was in
good health (R. 64, 119). There were no indications of
physical impairment. He was not then and had not for
many years been under medical care (R. 178).
On January 9, 1969, Judge Elton suffered a stroke
(R. 79). He was hospitalized for a time and then returned
to part-time employment. By the fall of 1969 he had re·
sumed his judicial duties and was working full-time (R.
47, 55, 65, 81).
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On January 1, 1970, he assumed the responsibilities
of Presiding Judge. These responsibilities substantially
increased his workload.
The Presiding Judge has general supervmon over
the functions of all 10 District Courts of the Third Judicial District. He presides over meetings of the District
Judges. He supervises and controls calendar assignments,
personnel problems, questions relating to the press and
usually personally handles cases that involve constitutional issues, if they can be sensed initially, and cases
of unusual public interest (R. 66).
From the time he resumed his fall judicial duties
until April 20, 1970, Judge Elton saw his doctor monthly
without complaints or medical findings (R. 81). On April
21, 1970, he came to Dr. Dalrymple's office complaining
of dizziness. He was clammy, unsteady in gait and had
experienced nausea and vomiting (R. 81-82).
The events leading to the conditions of April 21,
1970, are significant:
On Monday, April 6, 1970, Judge Elton passed sentence upon Clark Ronnow on one count of misusing public funds and dismissed six other counts (Ex. P-2).
City officials through newspaper comments had attempted to tell Judge Elton what he ought to do in the
Ronnow case and from the bench he told them that if
they wanted to tell him what to do, they had better appear in court on the sentencing date (R. 68-69).
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On Wednesday, April 15, Judge Elton started trial of '
Woodward v. Anderson, a 60-car freeway accident. Be.
tween April 6 and April 15, Judge Elton had had a full
schedule of trials and hearings (Ex. P-2).
1

1

The Woodward case continued through Thursday,
Friday and Monday, April 20 when the jury returned with
its verdict at 9: 11 p.m. (Ex. P-2).
The next day, on April 21, Judge Elton made a
special visit to Dr. Dalrymple. As previously noted, the
Judge was dizzy, clammy, unsteady and nauseated (R,
81, 82). Dr. Dalrymple believed he had suffered a stroke.
(R. 88).
He stayed home ill the 21st and 22nd (Ex. P-4). On
the 23rd he heard Motions in the Sunday Closing Law
Case (Ex. P-2).
On Friday, April 24, Arbor Day, he heard extensive
argument in the Sunday Closing Law Case (Ex. P-4).
On Monday, April 27, Judge Elton was again home
ill (Ex. P-4). He saw Dr. Dalrymple on Tuesday. He
was not good. The doctor insisted he stay home a week.
(R. 88, 122).
Judge Elton stayed home April 28th, 29th and 30th
and May 1st. The hearing in the Sunday Closing Law
Case set for April 29, was postponed until May 6 (R. 122).
His illness required him to postpone the announced date
for decision. This resulted in several "nasty" telephone
calls which really upset him (R. 125). On May 2 he again
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saw Dr. Dalrymple. He was not well. He was unsteady
and his speech was slurred (R. 55).

On Wednesday, May 6, Judge Elton heard final
arguments in the Sunday Closing Law Case. On Monday,
May 11 he started another jury case. On May 12 he ruled
on the Sunday Closing Law Case, started a non-jury case
and heard an annulment and divorce (Ex. P-3). He had
a jury case scheduled for May 13 but died that morning.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IS
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The defendant states as points that Judge Elton died
as a result of disease and not as result of accident and that
his stroke did not arise out of or occur in the course of
his employment.
These are not legal points on appeal. They are statements of position and arguments against the finding of
the lower court. The issue presented by this appeal is
simply whether the findings of the lower court are supported by competent evidence. Charlton v. Hackett, 11
Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961).

In this connection, the trial court was entitled to
consider both the medical and the non-medical evidence
and to apply that evidence under guidelines established
by the decisions of this court and other persuasive authorities.

5

The finding complained of reads:
"Judge Elton was killed by accident arising
out of or in the course of his employment" (R. 27),
There was an abundance of evidence to support this
finding.
The persons who knew him best - his wife, his
colleagues, his clerk, his bailiff and the lawyers who prac.
ticed before him - all bore witness to the deterioration
of his health brought upon by the stresses of the highly
sensitive cases handled by him during the last six weeks
of his life.
His physician, Dr. Dalrymple, testified that Judge
Elton suffered from vascular disease, resulting in
insufficient blood supply to the brain, and that this condi·
tion was aggravated by the stresses o Judge Elton's em·
ployment and that these stresses were the principal factor
in cutting short his life (R. 90-92).
In his report to the Retirement Board, Dr. Dalrymple

said:

"It is my opinion that Judge Elton's cerebral
thrombosis, which occurred on May 13, 1970, was
of sudden onset and undoubtedly precipitated by
the emotional tension which he underwent in the
performance of his judicial duties." (Ex. P-1).

Mr. Harry J. Calton, Judge Elton's Bailiff described
Judge Elton's health as "always good" (R. 46). He said
the judge applied himself to his work diligently (R. 48).
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In describing the public interest in the Ronnow Case

and the Sunday Closing Law Case, Mr. Calton said:
"Well, it was immense. There was a terrible
lot of interest. He had telephone calls and letters.
I don't know the nature of them because I didn't
read them. He was under a lot of pressure." (R.
48).
Mr. Calton observed that while Judge Elton had
these cases under consideration, he worked usually from
8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. and took work home with him
(R. 48). He worked a number of Saturdays (R. 49).
While the Sunday Closing Law Case was under consideration, Judge Elton had visitors in the office "all the
time." Every time he had a recess, it wasn't a recess for
him, according to Mr. Calton, as he had attorneys and
civilian people in there putting pressure on him (R. 49).
The judge became onery whereas he had been a "very
gentle man" (R. 49). He looked tired (R. 49).
David J. Shewell, Judge Elton's Clerk, recalled that
the case of State of Utah v. Ronnow had been assigned
to Judge Anderson (R. 56). He disqualified himself (R.
56). Judge Elton discussed the case with other judges
but no one wanted it. He said he didn't want it either but
couldn't make someone else take it, so he kept it (R. 57).
The Sunday Closing Law Case was also an unpopular
case. Judge Elton did not feel he could assign it to someone else (R. 57).
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Mr. Shewell recalls that during this case there were
continual calls and quite a bit of mail and attorneys waiting for the judge as he recessed court (R. 58). Judge
Elton was concerned (R. 58). He did a lot of reading (R.
58). He said he had been bothered at home and had considered unlisting his phone number (R. 59).
When Judge Elton read his decision from the bench,
the courtroom was full. There was quite a bit of emotion
in his voice (R. 59). He was under considerable strain but
agreed to a television interview at noon.
When he came off the bench at noon his chambers
were full of lights and cameras, and cords and micro·
phones. He could not get to his desk. He returned to the
courtroom and said he was not going in his chambers.
Before lunch he did go back and read his decision for the
reporters (R. 60). When he came back from lunch, he
was choking. He appeared nervous.
While Judge Elton had the Sunday Closing Law Case
under consideration, his speech was not clear and sharp,
he fumbled for words which was not like him (R. 61).
Mr. Shewell recalled the freeway accident case. It
involved 60 cars on a snow-slick road. They worked
late at night; the case was a strain on the judge (R. 61,
62).
Harold Waldo, Jr., one of the principal attorneys in
the Sunday Closing Case, testified that the case had "very
great public interest." (R. 135). There was a hearing on
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Arbor Day (April 24) by which a procedure for the handling of the case was agreed upon (R. 136). On May 6,
the court heard arguments of counsel starting at 10:00
a.m., continuing until noon, resuming at 2:00 and continuing until 5:00 (R. 137). In the morning the Judge
asked questions but as the afternoon proceeded the number of questions declined. He appeared to be fatigued,
withdrawn and worried (R. 138). During the afternoon
he interrupted counsel in the middle of a sentence to call
a recess, abruptly (R. 138).
On the day he announced his decision (May 12) it
was noteworthy that he was fatigued and seemed to be
extremely tired. He ascended the bench slowly. He took
considerable time to get to the chair. His voice was low
and subdued, where he normally had a booming voice that
carried very well. On this occasion it was difficult to
hear him. He announced his decision in a few words and
left the bench (R. 138-139).
Judge Elton was an independent-minded judge. He
at no time gave the impression that it didn't matter because his decision would be reviewed. The constitutional
point involved was particularly difficult (R. 141).
Mrs. Elton testified that Judge Elton always worked
from about 8 until 5 and always brought files home (R.
120). After he became presiding judge he spent even
more time and his lunch hours were often spent working
(R. 121).
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Judge Elton had many calls at home during the Ron.
now case (R. 121), and during the Sunday Closing Case.
He became markedly irritable in April (R. 122). When
he went in for his check-up (April 20), Dr. Dalrymple
told him to take it easy and rest a bit. The hearing was
postponed to May 6 (R. 122).
On May 5 he had been studying but he couldn't remember what he was doing. He insisted that his children
and his wife sit up with him until 3:00 a.m. because, he
said, "I have lost my memory completely." (R. 123).
The following weekend he worked on the Sunday
Closing Case (R. 123). He had promised the decision by
Tuesday, having previously announced that he would
make the decision earlier (R. 125).
On the 12th of May, Mrs. Elton met her husband for
lunch, but she could not get into his chambers because
it was full of cameras and newspaper men (R. 126). He
said, "I am not going to do it." She said, "Leonard, just
give a brief statement and get it over with," so he did
(R. 126). Although he had planned to meet Mrs. Elton
for lunch. He had lunch with an attorney and she picked
him up that evening (R. 127). He had a stroke the following morning (R. 127).
Judge Elton was under no strain during the six weeks
before his death other than his work (R. 128). He had no
financial problems (R. 129), no marital problems (R.
I 27), no problems with the children (R. 129).
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Dr. Dalrymple testified that from January 13, 1969,
until his death Judge Elton was suffering from an underlying vascular disease (R. 86). When Dr. Dalrymple saw
Judge Elton April 20, his condition was good (R. 50).
On the 21st, Dr. Dalrymple was of the opinion that the
judge had suffered another stroke (R. 88). He prescribed
a week off.
He next saw Judge Elton on April 28. His condition
was not much better. He changed his medication because
he was becoming more irritable and hypersensitive and
asked him to return on May 2nd (R. 88).
On that date he still didn't seem very well. He was
unsteady, his speech was slurred. He asked him to return
again in one week. On May 9 he had improved. On May
13 he was on the verge of death when Dr. Dalrymple
saw him at the hospital. He died in a matter of minutes
(R. 89).
From March until May, Judge Elton appeared to be
under stress or tension (R. 189). Judge Elton acknowledged he was tired and under stress (R. 94). This stress in
the opinion of the doctor aggravated the underlying disease and contributed to his death. In the opinion of the
doctor, this aggravation was the principal factor in bringing about Judge Elton's death (R. 92).
Dr. Dalrymple said that Judge Elton had the potentiality for a stroke before April 21, 1970, but" . . . he had
something happen between the 20th and 21st that caused
it which I couldn't say precipitated it, but I know what
happened." (R. 102).
11

Dr. Dalrymple said:
"Those people who work under a lot of pres.
sure have a very high incidence of vascular dis.
ease: attorneys, doctors, high business executives
and there are certain factors which make them
more vulnerable to the disease of the arteries, but
we don't know them." (R. 109).
The legal structure within which this evidence is to
be considered is the Judicial Retirement Act which provides:
"Disability retirement compensation - Widows' pensions. - Any judge who has had ten years
of service and who is retired on grounds of dis·
ability pursuant to Section 49-7-8( d) shall be en·
titled to the disability retirement compensation
provided for in this act. Any judge, regardless of
the years of service, whose disability arises out of
or in the course of performance of his judicial
duties and the widow of every judge who is killed
by accident arising out of or in the course of his em·
ployment, wheresoever such injury occurred, shall
be entitled to the disability retirement compensa·
tion or widows' pensions, respectively, provided
for in this act." Section 49-7-4, U.C.A., 1953.
The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act employs
language identical to that found in the Judges' Retirement Act. Several cases construing the Workmen's Com·
pensation Act of Utah support Mrs. Elton's right to a
widow's pension.

Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140,
427 P.2d 740 ( 1967), involved a fireman who suffered a
mild heart attack because of anxiety he experienced dur·
12

ing an alarm, but did not seek medical aid until six
months later when he experienced similar pains. He
claimed that a pre-existing heart ailment was aggravated
by his duties as a fireman.
His doctor testified before the Commission that acute
stress, strain, and emotional aggravation could have
aggravated an underlying or pre-existing coronary artery
difficulty. The Commission, however, denied compensation based on the report of a medical panel. The panel
felt that the events of the evening of the fire showed no
more emotional tension than that of many other fires
that had been the usual part of his occupational duties for
four years prior and that progression was a natural part
of the course of coronary artery disease.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, saying that the
fact there is no direct evidence the plaintiff suffered greater anxiety and emotion than usual is not determinative
whether an industrial accident occurred, that aggravation of a pre-existing disease by an industrial accident is
compensable and that an internal failure brought about
by exertion in the course of employment may be an accident within the meaning of the act.
In Jones v. Calif. Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244
P. 2d 530 (1952), a pea vinery supervisor worked long
hours on several successive days. The work was not particularly strenuous physically but there was much mental
stress. He became ill while at work, went home and died
shortly thereafter as a result of a coronary occlusion. The
Commission denied compensation.
13

The Supreme Court ruled that compensation should
have been granted, saying:
"It is settled beyond question that a pre-existing disease or other disturbed condition or defect
of the body, when aggravated or lighted up by
an industrial accident, is compensable under the
act, Graybar Electric Co., Inc. v. Industrial Comm.,
73 Utah 568, 276 P. 161; Thomas D. Dee Memorial
Hospital Ass'n. v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah
61, 138 P.2d 233. And also that an internal failure
brought about by exertion in the course of employment may be an accident within the meaning
of Sec. 42-1-43, U.C.A., 1943, without the re·
quirement that the injury result from some incident which happened suddenly and is identifiable
at a definite time and place. Robertson v. Industrial Comm., 109 Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Industrial
Comm., supra,- Hammond v. Industrial Comm.,
84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Comm., 115 Utah I, 201 P.2d 961, 966.
In the latter case, Mr. Justice Wade stated:

'* * * this court is definitely committed to
the proposition that where an employee suf·
fers an internal failure or breakdown which
results from overexertion in the course of his
employment that such is a compensable acci·
dent injury * * *' Citing cases." 244 P.2d
at 642.
Several other jurisdictions have granted compensa·
tion in similar factual situations. In Lumbermen's Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Ind. Accid. Comm., 29 Cal. 2d 492, 175
P.2d 823 (1946), the California Supreme Court held that
arterial hypertension and arterial apoplexy brought on
by long working hours is a compensable injury. All rea-
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sonable doubts whether an injury arose out of the employment are to be resolved in favor of the employee.
The Court stated that a heart attack brought on by strain
and overexertion incident to employment is a compensable
injury though the condition existed previously and even
though there was no traumatic injury. The Court also
held that there is no requirement of unusual strain only a casual connection between the strain of the employment and the injury suffered need be shown.
In Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. State Ind. Accid.

Comm., 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148 (1952), a compensation award was upheld by the Supreme Court where the
claimant suffered a stroke. Shortly before he had worked
65 days for 11 hours per day in an atmosphere of strain
and tension attempting to conclude contract negotiations.
The medical testimony showed that the long hours
coupled with the tense and trying condition which surrounded them could have aggravated an existing hypertension which in turn could precipitate a cerebral vascular
accident. The Court said it realized that the point of the
stroke is reached through the cumulative effect of each
day's strain and that it cannot be said that any one particular exposure to strain and tension was responsible.
Despite no traumatic accident, the Court upheld the compensation award.

Hoage v. Royal Ind. Co., 90 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir.
1937), held that an insurance adjuster who had worked
long hours and worried over his work and, as a result,
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suffered a heart attack, should not be denied compensa.
tion. Mental strain was deemed sufficient to justify the
award.

In Rathbun v. Taber Tank Lines, 283 P.2d 966
(Mont. 1955), compensation was granted to the widow
of a truck driver who died of a heart attack. He had worked long hours, did not get regular sleep, and was driving
on icy roads. The evidence was deemed sufficient to
show the driver suffered from an employment connected
m1ury.
In Schechter v. State Ins. Fund., 160 N.E. 2d 901
(N.Y. 1959), an attorney or an insurance company died
from a heart attack. His workload had increased significantly in the weeks preceding his death. He was under
constant strain. The Court of Appeals ruled that compensation should be granted if a claimant was under unusual strain by his employment despite the fact that the
work performed by him which precipitated the heart failure is the same general type in which he is regularly involved. So long as unusual strain is placed on the claimant
by his work so that his heart is affected, the requirements
for compensation are met.
In Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 176
N.E. 2d 714 (N.Y., 1961), compensation was granted an
employee who died of a heart attack. Emotional strain
over an excess repair bill for an aircraft of his employer
caused his death. The New York high court ruled that
the death was employment connected.
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In Little v. ]. Korber & Co., 71 N.M. 294, 378 P.2d
119 (1963), Irving Little became emotionally upset at
work as manager of a wholesale department of a hardware store. He died shortly after of a myocardial infraction due to arterio-sclerotic heart disease due to generalized arteriosclerosis. The trial court held that his death
was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment. The Supreme Court of New Mexico
affirmed, saying:

"* * * Where a case is tried by the court
without a jury, the court is the sole judge of credibility of witnesses and weight to be given their
testimony. * * *
"It has long been the rule that in determining
whether evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial
court's findings of fact, this court on appeal will
consider only that evidence and inferences to be
drawn therefrom which support the findings, and
we will not consider any evidence unfavorable to
the findings. The findings of the trial court will
not be disturbed when they are supported by any
substantial evidence and this court will not weight
the evidence where conflicts exist. * * *"
The only other case in Utah construing the Judicial
Retirement Act is the case styled In the Matter of the Retirement of Horace C. Beck, (Utah 3d Judicial District,
Civil No. Misc. 4-64, 1969). In that case District Judge
Bryant H. Croft said:
"Judge Beck, at 76, undoubtedly has been
subject to 'the aging process.' The fact that a heart
condition is sometimes caused, as Dr. Behrens
noted, by an aging process should not, of itself,
bar one from disability retirement compensation.
17

Under Utah law a judge is entitled to such com.
pensation if his disability arises 'in the line of duty'
or as a result of 'the performance of his duty.' Dr.
Behrens' report stated that while he did not feel
that Judge Beck's work as a judge is primarily
responsible for the basic heart problem, he did
believe that the work as a judge had certainly
aggravated the condition and helped to precipitate
congestive heart failure in the sense that increased '
physical activity and pressures of such a position
do contribute to increase the work load of the
heart. As a judge, this writer has difficulty in
recognizing that the duties of a judge necessarily
increases one's 'physical activity,' but the pressures and tensions present in the role of a judge
is a matter of which this writer feels compelled to
take judicial notice.
"Prior to becoming a judge, Judge Beck had
enjoyed excellent health, had no prior indication
of heart disease, and was and is a tall, thin man
not burdened with the excess weight which
prompts doctors to suggest reducing to avoid heart
problems. Nothing is in the record to suggest that
Judge Beck has at any time done anything, except
to grow older graciously, in the performance of his
duties as a judge, that could be construed as the
causal responsibility for the heart condition that
now compels his retirement. A disability that
evolves from such ailments as a stroke or heart
attack appears to me to be the end product of a
gradual process hastened in its arrival time in
some cases by the extra stresses and strains that
required activities cause. In such cases the question
as to whether such disability came in the line of
duty cannot depend for its answer upon the timing
of the heart attack that brings the disease to its disability climax. Whether it comes in the courtroom
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or the bedroom, in chambers or in the kitchen,
should make no difference in the conclusion to be
reached.
"The heart, like the filament of the globe,
works for thousands of hours, then suddenly, perhaps without even the flick of a switch, fails in
its function. The cause, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, is not the last act of the moment
preceding the attack, but in all probability is the
summation of many elements contributing each in
its own way over the years to the end result.
"When we are confronted with the necessity
of determining the causal connection between disability brought on by heart disease and the performance of one's duty, an important element is, it
seems to me, not so much what caused it, but rather what did not cause it. In Judge Beck's case, the
only thing that seems certain is that we cannot say
that his heart attack occurred as a result of some
affirmative act on his part that had no connection
with his duty as a judge and was of his own doing.
We could not determine with any degree of medical certainty all of the factors that contributed to
the ultimate result that occurred on March 16,
1969. Perhaps no one factor 'caused' it. That the
tensions and pressures of the judge's duties could
be and probably was a contributing factor seems
evident from Dr. Behrens' report.
that,

"Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., stated
'The life of the law has not been logic; it
has been experience.'

"Experience shows that heart failures come
from the grinding of day-to-day living and working. When it finally fails from no more than a
flick of the switch, it seems reasonable to believe
that the tensions in the life of a judge over a span
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of years preceding the attack constitute a con.
tributing factor of more than de minimis propor.
tions and, in turn, constitutes a causal connection
between the resulting disability and the 'line of
duty' and in Judge Beck's case, I so find.
"It is, therefore, my conclusion that Judge
Horace C. Beck, because of physical illness, has
become substantially and permanently incapacitat.
ed to perform the duties of his office, that as a
consequence thereof, he is disabled and should be
placed in a retirement status and his office be deem.
ed vacant, and that Judge Beck became disabled in
the line of duty, or as a result of the performance
of his duty, and is entitled to the disability retirement compensation provided for in the Judges'
Retirement Act."
Judge Beck's heart attack occurred at the Elks Lodge.
His case was not appealed.
Appellant's Point I on cause of death is an argument
as to the weight of the evidence and the permissible in·
ferences therefrom. Such arguments are for trial courts,
not appellate courts. The same arguments were made to
Judge Erickson and were properly rejected by him.
Appellant's thesis seems to be that Judge Elton's
underlying disease was not caused by his employment. We
have never said it was. Our position has been and is that
the stresses of his employment, acting upon his underlying
disease, cut short his life.
The lives of all of us will end some day. To be
killed is not to have one's life ended; it is to have one's
life shortened. Even though Judge Elton may have died
20

from vascular disease at some point in time, if that point
was accelerated by employment connected stress, he was
killed by accident arising out of his employment as surely
as the consumptive miner killed in a cave-in.
Justice Crockett noted the difference between heart
attack cases and back cases in his concurring opinion in
Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 22 Utah
2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969), a back case relied upon by
the Appellant. He did not join in the court's comments
about ]ones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612,
244 P.2d 530 (1952), and Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial
Comm., 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949), saying:
"They are different from the instant case and
speak for themself ."

Pintar v. Industrial Comm., 14 Utah 2d 276, 382
P. 2d 414 (1963), also relied upon by Appellant is another
back injury case. It merely holds there was evidence to
support the Commission's findings.
Carling v. Industrial Comm., 16 Utah 2d 260, 399
P.2d 202 ( 1965 ), a loss of hearing case cited by Appellant
is actually against the Appellant's position. The court
there expressly recognized that the term accident " . . . is
not necessarily restricted to some single incident which
happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or
other repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such
manner as to properly fall within the definition of an
accident . . ."
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Nor do Mellen v. Industrial Comm., 19 Utah 2d 373,
431 P.2d 798 ( 1967), or Burton v. Industrial Comm., 13
Utah 2d 353, 374 P.2d 439 (1962), support Appellant.
In Mellen the medical panel reported that Mellen's onset
of pain while roofing was only symptomatic of a natural
degenerative condition. The Commission denied compen.
sation even though Mellen's personal physician thought
that the onset was due to extra exertion on the roof. The
court held only that the Order was based on competent \
evidence. In Burton, the medical panel found that Burton's I
myocardial infraction was not caused by exertion. The
\,
Commission so held. This court held the Commission did
not act arbitrarily.
These cases are better authority for Mrs. Elton's posi·
tion than for Appellant's. In this case we have medical
testimony from Dr. Dalrymple that Judge Elton's death
was due to the stresses of his work as a judge and a total
absence of testimony to the contrary.
Dr. Roger M. Dalrymple was licensed to practice
medicine in 1943 (R. 75 ). He has specialized in internal
medicine for the past 23 years, having previously spent
three years in the army in internal medicine, two years at
the University of Utah and having been certified by the
American Board of Internal Medicine in 1952 (R. 75).
He is on the staff of St. Mark's Hospital and University
Hospital and is Assistant Clinical Professor of Medicine
at the University of Utah (R. 76).
The Appellant offered no evidence to rebut the testi·
mony of Dr. Dalrymple. Indeed, Appellant offered no
evidence at all in this case (R. 144).
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Appellant's Point III relative to course of employment is wholly unsupported by relevant authorities. They
all involve the question whether employees are covered
while going to or from work or during lunch. None are
heart attack or stroke cases.
The fact that the fatal stroke occurred at home rather than on the bench is irrelevant. Section 49-7-4, U.C.A.,
1953, provides it applies " . . . wheresoever such injury
occurred. . . ."
Appellant cites authorities to establish that it is irrelevant that death occurs on the job if there is no causal
relation between the employment and the death. These
same cases also establish the corollary, i.e., if there is a
causal relationship between the employment and the
death, the death arises out of the employment whether
or not in the course of the employment in the sense of
time and place. See all the authorities relied upon by
Appellant under its Point III.
CONCLUSION
A judge does not unburden himself of the responsibilities of his office when he walks out of the courthouse.
He takes his decisions home with him and frequently to
bed with him. The fact that a decision has been reached
does not remove this burden. The agony of decision is
not so easily cast aside. Second thoughts and recurring
doubts are part of the daily life of the conscientious judge.
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The Utah State Retirement Act created the Retire.
ment Board which administers the Judges' Retirement
Fund. That Act provides:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
legislature that this act be liberally construed so
that the benefits and protections as herein provided shall be extended as broadly as reasonably
possible." Section 49-10- 7, supra.
Mrs. Elton is entitled to her pension. The defendant
should be required to pay her the compensation provided
by law.
Respectfully submitted,

WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
AND HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor, Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
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ADDENDUM

'

NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES
The fact that Judge Elton's fatal attack
occurred after he had made his decision in
the Sunday Closing Law case does not affect
his widow's right to her pension. In Thompson
v. American Casualty co., 20 Utah 2d 418, 439
P.2d 276 (1968), the plaintiff was under considerable stress during the five.weekdays but
rested at home on Sa~urday and took a short
drive to visit relatives. He was stricken
that night after returning home during his
sleep.
Even though a person has· a diseased ·
condition which would eventually result in
his death, if an accident occurs which
hastens his death, recovery can be had.
Whitlock v. American Insurance Co., 21 Utah
2d 131, 442 P.2d 26 (1968).
Determination of cause of death is the
exclusive prerogative of the factfinder. Id.
See also Dienes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co.,
21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468 (1968).

